Port 465 got written off as dead for nearly two decades, and the obituary was wrong. When RFC 2487 introduced STARTTLS in 1999, the IETF reclassified 465 as reserved and told everyone to move to port 587. Mail administrators dutifully did. Then in 2018, RFC 8314 formally reversed course and reclaimed 465 for implicit TLS submission. The myth persists anyway, partly because old documentation never got updated and partly because «465 is deprecated» was repeated so often it hardened into fact. Here is the distinction that actually matters in production: port 465 wraps the entire SMTP session in TLS from the first byte, while port 587 opens in plaintext and negotiates encryption with a STARTTLS command. Two accounts with identical credentials, identical hostnames, and identical certificates can behave completely differently behind the same firewall depending on which port you chose.
How implicit and explicit TLS differ on the wire
On port 465, the client opens a TCP connection and immediately performs a TLS handshake. There is no plaintext SMTP greeting, no EHLO, no negotiation step. The server speaks TLS or nothing. This is why the port is called implicit TLS (sometimes SMTPS, a label that fell out of favor but never really died). On port 587, the client connects in the clear, reads the server’s 220 banner, sends EHLO, checks whether STARTTLS appears in the extension list, issues the STARTTLS command, and only then upgrades the channel. Everything before that upgrade, including the EHLO hostname, crosses the wire unencrypted.
That structural difference has consequences beyond academic purity. A firewall or mail gateway that inspects TLS handshakes sees a ClientHello as the very first payload on a 465 connection. On 587, it sees an SMTP banner exchange first, then a handshake mid-stream. Deep packet inspection rules, SNI-based filtering, and TLS-terminating proxies frequently handle these two patterns with different code paths, and some handle one correctly and mangle the other. A rule that permits «SMTP on 587» may silently break a 465 client because the device classified the traffic as opaque TLS on a non-standard port and reset it. Same mailbox, same user, different failure mode.
The practical upshot is that implicit TLS is simpler and more robust by design. There is no downgrade window, no risk of a misconfigured client sending credentials before the upgrade, and no dependence on the server advertising the right extension. STARTTLS on 587 is fine when it works, but it carries a well-known failure mode: a client that is not configured to require TLS can be stripped back to plaintext by an active attacker or a broken relay. If you run 587, enforce STARTTLS as mandatory in the client, not optional.
Why port 587 still dominates submission
Port 587 remains the default for authenticated submission, and the reason is mostly institutional inertia plus one real advantage: it traverses networks that block outbound 465. Plenty of corporate egress policies and hotel networks still permit 587 and nothing else on the submission side. Most major providers support both. Microsoft 365 uses the SMTP server smtp.office365.com on port 587 with STARTTLS as its documented default, though it accepts 465 as well. The encryption is equivalent once the session is established; the difference is entirely in how the channel gets there. If you are choosing, prefer 465 where the network allows it and fall back to 587 with mandatory STARTTLS where it does not.
Reading server settings by provider without guessing
The question «what is my IMAP server» has no universal answer because server hostnames, ports, and authentication requirements differ by provider, account type, and sometimes data center. Gmail uses the IMAP server imap.gmail.com on port 993 with SSL, and since January 2025 Google enables IMAP by default rather than requiring users to flip a switch in settings. That default-on change quietly fixed a huge volume of «my mail app will not connect» tickets, because the most common cause was IMAP simply being disabled at the account level, and users often did not know where to check their incoming mail server settings.
Other providers diverge sharply. Outlook.com disables POP and IMAP access by default and requires modern authentication (OAuth2), so a plain password will fail no matter how correct your ports are. Yahoo Mail requires an app password for third-party apps, which means the username is your full email address and the password is a generated token, not your account login. iCloud Mail does not support POP3 at all, so any client configured for POP3 against an Apple address is chasing a protocol the server will never speak. Zoho Mail varies server names by account type and data center, so a hostname copied from a blog post for the wrong region will time out. This is exactly the mess that directories like AllMail exist to untangle: it publishes IMAP, POP3 and SMTP settings by provider so you are not reverse-engineering hostnames from forum threads.
Whatever the provider, email apps require three things to work: an incoming server, an outgoing server, and the right ports with encryption. The incoming side is IMAP on 993 (SSL/TLS) or POP3 on 995 (SSL/TLS). The outgoing side is SMTP on 465 (implicit TLS) or 587 (STARTTLS), with 25 reserved for server-to-server relay and blocked by most consumer ISPs. Use your full email address as the username, and use an app-specific password wherever the provider demands one. For custom domain mail, the hostname is usually your provider’s, not your domain, unless you run your own mail server.
Check three things before you file a ticket: confirm the port matches the encryption mode (465 with implicit TLS, 587 with STARTTLS, never the reverse), confirm the username is the complete address, and confirm the account has IMAP or POP enabled and an app password issued if required. If a connection works on 587 but dies on 465 behind a specific firewall, you have found a TLS inspection rule, not a bad password. Test both ports from the network in question, and standardize on implicit TLS where policy permits it. Port 465 earned its reputation back; configure it deliberately and it will outlast the myth.

